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Why do entities get involved in proliferation? exploring the criminology of 
illicit WMD-related trade 
Daniel Salisbury 
 
This article seeks to provide an original approach to WMD-related illicit trade by drawing on criminology and focusing 
on the transactional level. Specifically, the article discusses the “rational choice” model as a way to understand an 
entity’s involvement in illicit trade, and considers also the limitations to this approach, as well as the role that 
opportunity plays in an actor’s decision to engage in illicit trade. The article draws the conclusion that prospects for 
deterring illicit trade using export controls and related criminal sanctions are limited. Beyond the clear limitations of 
rational-choice model, the prospects for deterring illicit WMD trade are limited by the low levels of certainty in export-
control enforcement, something that the criminology literature suggests is of greater importance than severity of 
punishment in deterring crime. Nonproliferation successes are more likely to be found in further efforts to develop 
tools to address proliferation opportunities, an area which has already seen much work. Efforts to further raise illicit 
WMD-related trade from the realms of “invisible crime” are necessary, including further conceptual research on illicit 
trade.  
 
Keywords: nonproliferation; proliferation procurement; illicit trade; crime; white collar crime; export controls; 
enforcement; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; criminology. 
 
Individuals and entities from the private sector have long contributed to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), acting as suppliers, middlemen, financiers, and shippers in 
proliferation-related transactions. Over the past decades, trade in WMD-related goods has become 
increasingly regulated, and illicit trade increasingly criminalized. Despite the clear role that these 
actors have played in recent proliferation cases, the literature on proliferation behavior has largely 
continued to focus on the state level. This article seeks to expand the existing literature by 
considering insights that can be generated by looking at illicit WMD-related trade as crime. It 
focuses on proliferation-related illicit trade at the transactional level: what causes manufacturers, 
suppliers, and middlemen to become involved in illicit trade? 
 
The article is structured in four main parts. The first summarizes the role of these actors in 
proliferation and then considers the intersection—both in practice and the academic literature—
between proliferation and crime. In the second, third, and fourth sections, the article draws on 
criminology’s “rational choice” model, exploring its limitations as well as another criminology 
theory that focuses on the role of opportunity in causation. 1 This discussion demonstrates that the 
literatures on business and crime can yield insights relevant for nonproliferation. Overall, the 
article concludes that while significant challenges remain in deterring proliferators from 
                                                 
1 The term “proliferator” is used throughout to refer to individuals and entities involved in illicit trade in 
WMD- or missile-relevant goods, rather than proliferating states. 
  
involvement in illicit trade, raising awareness within industry and a greater role for Situational 
Crime Prevention  are important measures to prevent future proliferation.  
 
 
The criminalization of involvement in WMD proliferation 
 
Diverse states have utilized the international marketplace to source goods for their nuclear, 
chemical, and biological-weapons programs and their means of delivery. The dual-use nature of 
many WMD-related technologies has meant that even the earliest programs drew on 
manufacturing capabilities and expertise from producers of goods for civilian use. Over recent 
decades, the manufacturing base for many of these items has expanded as manufacturing 
capabilities spread. The development of the nonproliferation regime led to increased restrictions 
on the acquisition and supply of these technologies, forcing proliferating states to utilize illicit 
procurement techniques. While Iranian and North Korean illicit procurement efforts have received 
much recent attention, a wide range of states have drawn on the international marketplace and 
utilized illicit procurement methods for their WMD programs.2  
 
The actors involved in these illicit procurement efforts are diverse in type and role, as well as in 
their relationship to the goods being sought. They range in size from large multinational 
corporations to small enterprises and include manufacturers, distributors,  middlemen, and brokers, 
as well as actors that facilitate proliferation but who, in practice, never handle the goods being 
procured, such as financial institutions, insurers, and shipping agents. Proliferators cover the 
spectrum, from private-sector enterprises to state-owned companies, some engaged in legitimate 
business in addition to their illegal procurement activities. They also include individual  
procurement agents working directly for state programs, although these entities are not the focus 
of this article.   
 
                                                 
2 For example, a list of proliferating states that have used illicit procurement to develop nuclear programs 
includes, but is not limited to, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, 
the Soviet Union, and Syria. 
  
The goods that these actors provide are also diverse. This article focuses on actors dealing in 
technologies and equipment that would be used to produce material for nuclear weapons—rather 
than nuclear material itself—as well as technologies and equipment needed for chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery. The illicit trade in turnkey manufacturing 
capabilities and the complete technical information package needed to construct such facilities —
such as uranium enrichment plants or missile-production capabilities—has decreased. Rather, 
proliferators are more actively engaged in procuring constituent parts and the technologies and 
raw materials needed to produce them. These strategic goods are not usually supplied by the large 
defense, nuclear, and aerospace companies that often have substantial Internal Compliance 
Programs (ICPs) in place, but rather by firms in their supply chains, including smaller 
manufacturers and distributors. For the latter firms, however, establishing programs to ensure that 
their goods do not end up in a WMD program can be especially burdensome financially, given 
their more limited resources.  
 
Although there is a long history of states seeking to prevent illicit trade and punish WMD 
proliferators, in recent years national governments have expanded their criminalization of this 
conduct, defined here as “the institutionalized process through which certain acts and behaviors 
are labeled as ‘crimes’ and ‘outlawed.’”3 This can been seen in a number of respects: in the general 
appreciation that contributing to a WMD or related missile program constitutes criminal conduct; 
in the spread of legislation against proliferation at the national level, with associated mandated 
penalties; and the related evolution of new law-based tools used to counter proliferation and punish 
those facilitating it.  
 
With regard to the first two points, United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 
(2004) has been instrumental. It provides a broad and sweeping definition of what constitutes 
assisting a WMD program. In the resolution, the Council:  
 
                                                 
3 “Crimes,” in turn, are defined as, “certain non-approved acts legislated against and, by due process of 
the law, punished.” Criminalization is said to reflect the state’s decisions “to regulate, control, and punish 
selectively.” Katheryn Chadwick and Phil Scraton, “Criminalization,” in Eugene McLaughlin and John 
Muncie, eds. The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology (London: SAGE, 2013) p. 102. 
  
Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish 
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate 
controls over related materials and to this end shall: . . .  
 
Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and 
trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and 
regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on 
providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as 
financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as 
establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate 
criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and 
regulations… . [Emphasis added]4   
 
Thus UNSCR 1540 has created a clear legal requirement that all UN members put in place these 
laws and declare the facilitation of a WMD program to be a criminal offense. The resolution uses 
the strong operative phrase “decides” and was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, making 
it binding on all UN member states. States’ efforts to comply with this element of UNSCR 1540 
have been mixed, although in general terms significant progress has been made.5  
 
During the last two decades, there also has been a broader evolution of law-based 
counterproliferation tools. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs have been important 
in this respect, especially regarding the development of embargoes and other sanctions focused on 
various technologies and entities. UN embargoes on Iran and North Korea have prohibited the 
import and export of a wide range of WMD- and missile-related technologies and subjected 
individuals and entities closely associated with the sanctioned programs to travel bans and asset 
freezes. UN members have an obligation to enforce these measures at the national level. 
                                                 
4 UN Security Council 1540, S/RES/1540, OP 3, April 28, 2004, 
<www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004)>.  
5 See website of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), 
“National Implementation,” undated, <www.un.org/en/sc/1540/resolutions-committee-reports-and-SC-
briefings/security-council-resolutions.shtml>.  
  
 
Other sanctions were put in place at the national and regional levels—first and foremost by the 
United States, but also by the European Union and others. In the Iranian case, many of these were 
sectoral, seeking to weaken various elements of the Iranian economy to coerce Iran to take part in 
negotiations on restricting its nuclear program. Other elements of national and international 
sanctions were more focused, preventing trade with specific entities with links to the Iranian 
nuclear and missile programs. US sanctions used to counter Iran’s nuclear program included vastly 
expanded “extraterritorial” elements, applicable to foreign nationals or organizations with few 
connections to the United States.6 US, UN and EU sanctions on Iran were rolled back as part of 
the implementation of the JCPOA.7 
 
The aggressive expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing, particularly over the past 
two years, has led to a significant expansion of US, UN and other unilateral sanctions. These have 
been expanding to cover new business areas, to further pressure the Kim regime and also deny the 
proceeds from benefiting North Korea’s weapons programs. The US, and even the UN, have 
targeted a wider range of North Korean activities which are believed to finance the country’s 
weapons programs.8 Thus, the evolution of the nonproliferation toolset has included the 
criminalization of a growing list of business activities as part of a complex but patchwork legal 
landscape aimed at preventing proliferation. The fractured nature of this legal landscape –and 
                                                 
6 These extraterritorial elements were first seen in the 1990s and expanded dramatically around 2010. 
Matthias Herdegen, Principles of International Economic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
p. 79.  
7 P5+1 and Iran, “See Annex II – Sanctions-related commitments”, October 18, 2015 
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245320.pdf>. 
8 See for example the recent United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375 which imposes restrictions 
on sales to North Korea of natural gas and oil and export from North Korea of textiles. UN Security 
Council 2375, S/RES/2375, September 11, 2017.  < https://undocs.org/S/RES/2375(2017)>. Earlier 
resolutions imposed restrictions on other business activities including and United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2371 which imposes a ban on North Korean sales of coal, iron and lead ores, and 
seafood. UN Security Council 2371, S/RES/2371, August 5, 2017.  
<https://undocs.org/S/RES/2371(2017) >. A recent US Executive Order authorized sanctions against 
entities operating in an expended variety of North Korean business sectors including the construction, 
energy, fishing, information technology, manufacturing, medical, textiles, or transportation industries. 
White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Executive Order on Imposing Additional 
Sanctions with Respect to North Korea”, September 21, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/09/21/presidential-executive-order-imposing-additional-sanctions-respect-north>. 
  
especially its implementation– means that some proliferators are able to operate in some 
jurisdictions with relative impunity. 
 
Toward a greater understanding of proliferators and illicit trade 
 
Given the increased criminalization of WMD-related activities, however fractured, the 
criminology literature can provide useful insights. The proliferation literature has tended to focus 
on the “proliferation behavior” of states or individuals working in bureaucracies of proliferant 
states, rather than on the role of external individuals and entities in facilitating the process.9 Some 
scholars have considered the behavior of individuals trafficking nuclear and radiological materials, 
which is a much rarer phenomenon than the illegal transfer of dual-use technology and 
equipment.10 Much of the literature on the behavior of individuals and entities operating in the 
latter space has taken the form of detailed case studies, particularly surrounding the extensive 
network operated in the 1990s and early 2000s by Pakistani nuclear specialist A.Q. Khan, with 
only a minority of these scratching the surface of individuals’ motivations.11  
 
Some attempts have been made, however, to consider the decision-making calculus of individuals 
or companies at the transactional level regarding whether to supply a WMD program or comply 
with nonproliferation controls barring such supply.12 Additionally, the different types of actors and 
the varied levels of their awareness of the true nature of their activities have also been drawn 
together in a framework known as the “Four I’s” typology.13 This typology considers both non-
complicit actors who find themselves involved in proliferation (“innocent” and “ignorant” 
                                                 
9 See, for example Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter 1996 - 1997) pp. 54-86; Jacques Hymans, 
Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians and Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
10 See, for example, Lyudmila Zaitseva and Kevin Hand, “Nuclear Smuggling Chains: Suppliers, 
Intermediaries and End-Users,” American Behavioral Scientist vol.46, no.6 (February 2003) pp. 822-844. 
11 See for example International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: A.Q. Khan and the 
Rise of Proliferation Networks – A Net Assessment (UK: Routledge, 2005) 
12 See, for example, Ian J. Stewart and Daniel Salisbury, “Non-State Actors as Proliferators: Preventing 
Their Involvement,” Strategic Trade Review Vol.2, No.3 (Autumn 2016), pp. 5-26; Daniel Salisbury, 
“Trade Controls and Non-Proliferation: Compliance Costs, Drivers and Challenges,” Business and 
Politics, Vol.15, No.4 (December 2013) pp. 529 -551.  
13 Stewart and Salisbury, “Non-State Actors as Proliferators,” p. 14-15. 
  
proliferators14) and complicit actors who have knowingly sought out illicit business (“indifferent” 
and “ideological” proliferators15) and are driven in varying degree by financial and ideological 
incentives. The framework also takes account of  individuals and large organizations, different 
parts of which may hold a greater or lesser understanding of proliferation-related transactions. 
More recently, a “resilience” framework has emerged to explain how illicit procurement networks 
change and adapt.16 However, the criminology literature, which can provide insights into both the 
factors shaping proliferators’ involvement as well as measures to counter this, remains unexplored.  
 
Apart from published case studies and estimated and partial statistics, much of the crime of 
proliferation remains undocumented. “Visibility” is important if actions are to be recognized as 
criminal, that is, “They must be witnessed, detected, and/or experienced.”17 In the criminology 
literature, the terms “hidden” or “invisible” refer to crimes that are largely unrecorded or 
understudied.18 Illicit trade shares a number of characteristics presented in a typology of invisible 
crime, in part because much of it goes undetected. These elements include: no knowledge (i.e., 
there is little public knowledge that the crime is being committed); no statistics (i.e., the conduct 
is omitted from official statistics or incorporated on a limited basis);19 no theory (i.e., as discussed 
above, little theoretical work has been conducted on illicit WMD-related trade); no politics (i.e., 
                                                 
14 “Innocent” proliferators are defined as those who are aware of the rules governing transfers of nuclear-
related goods, but “believe that they have done nothing wrong. In fact, they are often unaware that they 
may have done something wrong until they are alerted by the national authority.” “Ignorant” proliferators 
“do not possess an understanding of the regulations and controls, proliferation risks, and the broader 
social and political implications of their actions.” Ibid. 
15 “Indifferent” proliferators “understand what they have done, and they know it is probably wrong, but 
do not care.” “Ideological” proliferators “clearly understand that their actions are ‘wrong’ either in a legal 
or moral sense”, but conduct these transactions in order to help ensure the recipient program’s success, 
which they believe is right, and sometimes to counter elements of the nonproliferation regime which they 
believe is unfair or illegitimate.  Ibid. 
16 Aaron Arnold, “A Resilience Framework for Understanding Illicit Nuclear Procurement Networks,” 
Strategic Trade Review, Vol.3, No.4 (Spring 2017), pp. 3-23.  
17 Victor Jupp, Pamela Davies and Peter Francis, “The Features of Invisible Crime” in Victor Jupp, 
Pamela Davies and Peter Francis eds. Invisible Crimes: Their Victims and Their Regulation (UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1999) p. 5. 
18 Victor Jupp, “Hidden Crime.” in The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology, p. 220. 
19 For example, the US government does not release export control crime statistics. John Shiffman, 
Operation Shakespeare: The True Story of an Elite International Sting (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2015) p. 59. 
  
the crime is not an element of mainstream political debate); and no panic (i.e., the crime is not 
sensationalized in the media to the point of causing “moral panic” in society).20 
 
Several factors contribute to this “relative invisibility” of illicit trade.21 First, illicit trade and efforts 
to counter it are often conducted in secret; proliferators operate clandestinely to obscure their 
activities, while intelligence and enforcement agencies work secretly to uncover them. Second, 
illicit trade remains relatively invisible because it usually has no obvious victims; the WMD 
programs such trade supports are most often intended for deterrence, with possible use, a remote 
contingency. Nonetheless, illicit trade is not necessarily a “victimless crime.”22 Chemical weapons 
use by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria represents a clear example of how industry may 
contribute to a program that has brought death and suffering to many.23 Even in such cases, 
however, the role of illicit trade may not be readily apparent, and those involved, even knowingly, 
may feel divorced from these potential consequences. Third, discussion of the issue is confined to 
the relatively small community of nonproliferation experts. These three factors have led to limited 
interest and “moral panic” from the public.  
 
Despite this lack of scholarly and public attention to illicit trade, the criminology literature can 
provide useful insights regarding the actions of proliferators to better inform nonproliferation 
efforts. Two areas of the literature are particularly valuable.  The first examines what drives 
criminal behavior and what acts as a restraint against it. The second considers criminal behavior 
in relation to business and white-collar crime, a term originally coined by influential US 
criminologist Edwin Sutherland to refer to crimes committed by “respectable or at least respected 
                                                 
20 Victor Jupp, Pamela Davies and Peter Francis, “The Features of Invisible Crime,” p. 5. “Moral panic” 
has been defined as an “exaggerated mass media-led social reaction to what were initially minor acts of 
social deviance,” e.g., the mass media sensationalizing reports of street crimes, such as muggings. Steve 
Bruce and Steven Yearley, The SAGE Dictionary of Sociology (UK: SAGE, 2006) p. 203; Allan G. 
Johnson, The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology: A User's Guide to Sociological Language (UK: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2000) p. 201. 
21 A term used in Jupp, Davies and Francis, “The Features of Invisible Crime.” p.5. 
22 Defined as “a type of crime in which there is no identifiable victim who has suffered harm or loss.” 
Mark S. Davis, The Concise Dictionary of Crime and Justice (UK: SAGE, 2002) 
23 Cahal Milmo, Andy McSmith and Nikhil Kumar, “Revealed: UK Government let British Company 
Export Nerve Gas Chemicals to Syria,” The Independent, September 1, 2013, < 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/revealed-uk-government-let-british-company-export-
nerve-gas-chemicals-to-syria-8793642.html>.  
  
business and professional men.”24 Sutherland qualified his original definition suggesting it referred 
“principally to business managers and executives.”25 However, more recent definitions have been 
broader, for example a “heterogeneous group of offenses committed by people of relatively high 
status or enjoying high levels of trust, and made possible by their legitimate employment.”26 Some 
of the crimes considered in this broad area of study have useful but largely unexamined similarities 
with WMD-related trade.27 The scholarship in this area, for example, has explored the role of 
regulation, compliance, and enforcement—all concepts relevant to export controls. There are also 
synergies because these crimes also often occur in an “organizational context.”28  
  
With this background in mind, this article now proceeds to explore the rational-choice model found 
in criminology and its application and limitations to understanding involvement in illicit trade. The 
following section will also explore criminology’s opportunity theory as a further possible 
explanatory tool for understanding proliferation motivations.  
  
 
Gaining from proliferation: rational-choice theories 
 
Rational-choice theories of crime originated with the classicist view that “crime is rational, self-
interested, and freely chosen behavior.”29 Those committing a crime make decisions based on 
various factors shaping human behavior, including “the pursuit of maximum advantage, pleasure 
and happiness and the avoidance of pain, unhappiness and costs.”30 Proliferation procurers are 
driven to varying degrees by the desire either for financial gain and/or to advance an ideological 
                                                 
24 Edwin H. Sutherland, “White Collar Criminality,” American Sociological Review Vol.5, No.1 (1940), 
p. 1. 
25 Sutherland quoted in Michael L. Benson and Sally S. Simpson, Understanding White-Collar Crime: An 
Opportunity Perspective, 2nd Ed. (UK: Routledge, 2015) p. 5. 
26 Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte, “White Collar Crime” in The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology, pp. 
492-494. 
27 Export control violations have largely not featured in the literature on white-collar crime – one single 
exception is Bruce Zagaris, International White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials (Cambridge, UK: 
CUP, 2010) pp. 183-218. 
28 Benson and Simpson, Understanding White-Collar Crime, p. 67.  
29 A summary of these approaches is found in John Muncie, “Contemporary Criminology, Crime and 
Strategies of Crime Control” in John Muncie and David Wilson, Student Handbook of Criminal Justice 
and Criminology (UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2004), p. 4. 
30 Ibid. 
  
objective.31 It is clear that involvement in proliferation can be profitable, even more than 
involvement in legitimate trade. Network mastermind A.Q. Khan, for example, reportedly amassed 
a fortune of $400 million, although much of this likely came from corrupt practices rather than his 
network’s activities.32 Other cases clearly highlight the large amounts of money that can change 
hands in illicit trade, and the potential for large profits. Chinese missile proliferator Karl Lee, for 
example, allegedly received $10 million in payments from Iranian missile-related entities in just 
two years between 2010 and 2012.33 However, cases involving such lucrative earnings are clearly 
the exception rather than the rule. On a smaller scale, individual transactions may see a substantial 
mark-up, and brokers can take a substantial “cut” in facilitating transactions. Recent research 
suggests that procurement agents have worked to monetize the higher risks of illicit transactions 
through seeking higher commission.34 
 
Proliferators can also gain in an ideological sense, e.g. through the support for a country, political 
ideology, or regime. A significant proportion of those involved in sourcing goods for Iran’s nuclear 
program, for example, have been of Iranian origin or heritage, strongly suggesting that they were 
at least partly motivated by a desire to advance Iranian national interests. Similarly, North Korean 
smuggling networks often involve North Korean nationals, although whether their participation 
stems from love of country or coercion remains unclear. In a more specific case, the many 
interviews and writings of A.Q. Khan over the years have suggested that his worldview—a belief 
in “sharing” technology and breaking a “Western monopoly”— played a role in his activities.35 
 
Potential gains—financial or otherwise—must be considered against the higher levels of risk found 
in illicit trade compared to those of legitimate business. Illicit business relationships may be 
                                                 
31 Stewart and Salisbury, “Non-State Actors as Proliferators.” 
32 Sheila Jackson Lee, prepared statement for the Joint Hearing of Sub-Committees of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, “A.Q. Khan’s Nuclear Wal-Mart: Out of Business or 
Under New Management?” 110th Cong., 1st sess., June 27, 2007, p. 49. 
33 William Maclean and Ben Blanchard, “Exclusive: Chinese trader accused of busting Iran missile 
embargo,” Reuters, March 1, 2013, < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-trader/exclusive-
chinese-trader-accused-of-busting-iran-missile-embargo-idUSBRE9200BI20130301>. 
34 See, for example, John Park and Jim Walsh, “Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and 
Unintended Consequences,” MIT Security Studies Program Report, August 2016, p. 31, 
<https://www.brookings.edu/events/stopping-north-korea-inc/>.  
35 For some of Khan’s statements to this effect, see Stewart and Salisbury, “Non-State Actors as 
Proliferators,” p. 11. 
  
shorter-term and are likely to be less stable because of potential disruption by the authorities or the 
instability of procurement channels.36 An incipient illegal procurement can be exposed to 
suppliers, for example, if the purchaser offers to pay an unusually high price for the goods at issue 
or if its financial bona fides appear questionable. 37  
 
Systems of export controls are in place to regulate trade in sensitive technologies, with 
enforcement action taken against those who do not adhere. The system allows for the supplier state 
government to combine its secret intelligence on proliferation issues with the declared information 
about the potential transaction when assessing the risk of potential exports. Enforcement actions 
are—in theory—taken by national authorities when they uncover attempts by exporters to cheat 
the system or to baldly disregard licensing requirements altogether. Noncompliance can result in 
penalties, although these vary from country to country. 38  
 
As noted, according to rational-choice theories of crime, criminals are rational actors who weigh 
potential gains against potential risks. Raymond Paternoster and Sally Simpson of the University 
of Maryland provide a “rational choice theory of corporate crime” that is based on two 
assumptions:39 first, that decisions to offend are based on balancing its costs and benefits; and 
second, that these costs and benefits are subjective perceptions. They acknowledge that in practice, 
there are limits to the individual’s rational approach to decision making.  
 
The criminology literature provides some insights into the longer-term costs and benefits of 
involvement in crime, questioning whether “crime pays.” This research has sought to compare 
actual, estimated, and perceived financial gains and penalties from criminality, considering them 
next to possible earnings from legitimate employment. Studies have drawn varying conclusions, 
                                                 
36 Shiffman, Operation Shakespeare, p. 88. 
37 Discussion with export compliance professionals.  
38 German export control specialist Sibylle Bauer has proposed a typology of different penalties that 
violators could face, including administrative penalties (fines, loss of licenses, export privileges, property 
rights, closure of company and mandatory compliance training) and criminal penalties (fines and prison 
sentences). Sibylle Bauer, “WMD-Related Dual-Use Control Offenses in the European Union: Penalties 
and Prosecutions,” Non-proliferation Paper No.30, July 2013. 
39 Raymond Paternoster and Sally Simpson, “Sanctions Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a 
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime,” Law & Society Review, Vol.30, No.3 (1996) p. 553. 
  
even when they utilized the same datasets.40 Such concepts are even more difficult to assess in the 
context of WMD proliferation because many of those involved in illicit trade will be involved in 
legitimate trade simultaneously.  
 
Nonetheless, at least one concept provides a measure of clarity in the discussion of proliferation. 
This is the concept of the “serial proliferator,” a term used by officials to refer to individuals or 
companies—particularly those in China—involved in, and often sanctioned for, the repeated illicit 
procurement of WMD-related goods.41 There is clearly some overlap between serial-proliferator 
behavior and serial criminality more generally, with serial offenders defined as those carrying out 
at least three crimes of the same type, with an element of continuity in their behavior.42 These 
serial proliferators likely see gains that outweigh the growing risks and potential costs associated 
with their behavior. As greater and longer-term involvement in illicit activity likely raises the risk 
of detection, these serial proliferators often operate in jurisdictions with low or negligible risk of 
penalty. 
 
Rational-choice theory and deterrence 
 
Rational-choice theories of crime emphasize the role that deterrence can play in preventing 
criminal activity. Deterrence in this context is defined as “a philosophy of punishment that aims 
to prevent criminal activity through the development and application of effective and efficient 
sanctions.”43 Deterrence has two different facets: through denial—denying opportunities and 
making a criminal act more likely to fail—and the threat of punishment.44 To be effective, it needs 
to demonstrate that “the pains and losses associated with apprehension and punishment will 
overshadow the possibility of criminal gain or profit.”45 
                                                 
40 See for example James Q. Wilson and Allan Abrahamse, “Does Crime Pay?,” Justice Quarterly, Vol.9, 
No.3 (September 1992), pp. 359-377; Pierre Tremblay and Carlo Morselli, “Patterns in Criminal 
Achievement: Wilson and Abrahamse Revisited,” Criminology, Vol.38, No.2 (May 2000), pp. 633-657. 
41 Paula A. DeSutter, testimony before the U.S.-China Commission, “China's Record of Proliferation 
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Deterrence is a key facet of efforts to prevent illicit trade in WMD-related goods. Nonproliferation 
efforts, through the export-control system or otherwise, can contribute to deterrence by denial. 
Those considering involvement in illicit transactions would decide not to risk it because they 
perceive it to be too difficult. In this respect, nonproliferation tools help raise the perceived level 
of difficulty. Deterrence can also operate by communicating the risk of punishment. Export-control 
systems and enforcement efforts contribute to both of these forms of deterrence.  
 
Distinction is often drawn between “general” and “specific” deterrence. In the current discussion, 
a state’s effective implementation and enforcement of export controls with respect to all 
commodities reinforces and adds credibility to its efforts to deter illicit trade in WMD-related 
goods.46  Some definitions of general deterrence also suggest “making an example of” specific 
offenders to demonstrate potential costs to the wider community.47  
 
“Specific deterrence” has several dimensions. It can operate post-punishment, so that “the effects 
of legal punishment” extend beyond the initial penalty, persuading the penalized to prevent further 
involvement in illicit trade.48 Specific deterrence also includes, in relation to industry’s compliance 
with regulations, the pre-punishment deterrent effects of inspection and audit, as well as 
enforcement actions, even if only a warning is given and no penalty implemented.49  The term 
“implicit” deterrence has also been used to refer to the “message” sent to industry “simply by the 
dissemination of governmental regulations.”50  
 
Those writing on illicit trade prevention have suggested that, although deterrence works to a degree 
against many parties, it is not effective not against “determined malefactors,” although more severe 
penalties could enhance deterrence.51 However, in the area of export controls, there is little 
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conclusive data on the issue of deterrence. There is a consensus in the criminal-justice literature 
on deterrence that the certainty of punishment is more important than its severity.52 Some research, 
however, suggests that the severity of punishment can have an effect, although this evidence is 
said to be “highly ambiguous.”53 This has been seen only in relation to a small sample of previously 
punished companies.54 The importance of “celerity” or swiftness of punishment is also disputed in 
the literature.55  
 
While there is relatively little certainty in efforts to punish those involved in WMD-related illicit 
trade, there is evidence that both states familiar with and those new to export-control systems place 
considerable weight on a punishment’s severity. For example, the nine-year sentence in the 
prosecution of Sihai Cheng surpasses penalties in other cases for export violations involving 
WMD-related commodities in the United States.56 An agent involved noted: the “lengthy sentence 
serves as a warning to others that stiff penalties are waiting for anyone attempting to steal or sell 
American technologies or trade them to foreign powers.”57  Elsewhere, Malaysia’s relatively new 
export-control legislation includes the possibility of the death penalty for violators (although it has 
thus far not been invoked).58  
 
Limits on a rational-choice model 
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The notion that individuals and entities are unlikely to become involved in illicit trade without the 
perceived and actual benefits outweighing the costs is valid. However, there are clear limitations 
to the explanatory power of rational-choice theory and the utility of deterrence. While proliferation 
can be profitable for individuals and entities, A.Q. Khan and Karl Lee are far from typical. Many 
procurement agents are running much smaller-scale operations that are less profitable. In the 
Cheng case, for example, $2 million of goods were transferred to the Iranian nuclear program, but 
Cheng received just “a few thousand dollars a year” in profits, once the dividends were distributed 
among thirteen co-conspirators.59 Profits within the dual-use area are often more modest than those 
from other illicit trafficking activities—such as arms or narcotics trafficking—making WMD-
related commodity trafficking a less than rational choice for parties willing to engage in criminal 
behavior in the hopes of financial gain. Nor does the rational-actor theory always sufficiently 
explain the behavior of more complex organizational environments, which are often not unitary 
actors.  
 
While it is uncommon to accrue significant wealth from involvement in WMD-proliferation, there 
may be other specific financial incentives. The literature on white-collar crime suggests that 
individuals often become criminals to avoid bankruptcy or failure, rather than to make their 
fortune. Strain theory suggests that failure to achieve highly valued goals creates “strain,” or 
pressure, to deviate from legitimate activities.60 In a similar vein, some research has also suggested 
that white-collar criminals are not so much greedy as they are afraid of losing what they already 
have.61  
  
Evidence from other industries suggests that businesses do not think or behave in a mere cost-
benefit manner. Businesses are not “amoral calculators,” purely interested in maximizing profit.62 
Other political, social, environmental, cultural, and ideological factors also play a role in their 
outlook and decision making. Moreover, it is neither realistic nor possible to make decisions purely 
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based on costs and benefits. The decisions of proliferators suffer from limited information—their 
view of the risks, for example, is incomplete. Simon has introduced the concept of “bounded” or 
“limited” rationality, which holds that the lack of complete knowledge and difficulties anticipating 
consequences and outcomes can limit the rational actions of individuals and organizations.63 
 
The social environment can also influence decisions. The concept of “differential association,” for 
example, suggests that a person’s associates shape their views on what is appropriate behavior. 
Criminal behavior, according to this concept, is “learned in association with those who define such 
criminal behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably.”64 This could 
apply, for instance, to cases where one individual persuades another to join an illicit business 
venture.  
 
Another limitation on the rational-choice model is the difficulty applying it to large organizations. 
Even in cases where a company has a clearly stated approach to export compliance, employees do 
not always abide by it. For example, there have been cases of salesmen continuing to conduct illicit 
transactions against the policy proposed by the company leadership, such as what allegedly 
happened in the mid-2000s in a large Chinese state-owned enterprise.65 While the rational-actor 
model may have value in explaining the actions of the leadership and the salesman in this case, 
approaches drawing on organizational theory may have more value in explaining the divergence 
at different levels in the organization, and the lack of a compliance culture.66  
 
A further limitation on the rational-choice model is the involvement of “unwitting proliferators”— 
either innocent or ignorant— who are unaware their goods contributed to a WMD program.67 Their 
involvement was not consciously chosen but rather resulted from a failure to implement an ICP or 
“beyond-compliance practices,” such as terminating all commerce with states of concern. In this 
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respect, proliferation is the result of an individual or organization’s negligence, defined generally 
as the “failure to exercise a degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence (a reasonable man) 
would exercise under the same circumstances” and “carelessness amounting to the culpable breach 
of duty.”68 
 
Deterrence reconsidered 
There are limited prospects for deterring the involvement of individuals and entities in illicit trade. 
This is not only because deterrence is ineffective against “determined malfeasants,” as suggested 
in existing studies, but also because the rational-choice model is not ubiquitously relevant, and 
because national authorities have difficulty punishing those involved in illicit trade and 
communicating this to others who might choose this path.  
 
As noted above, the criminology literature highlights the importance of punishment certainty in 
successful deterrence. Each stage required for the effective enforcement of strategic trade 
controls—detection, investigation, and prosecution—has its own distinct challenges. Investigating 
cases of illicit trade can take years, involving significant undercover work and cooperation with 
partners overseas.69 This can be both difficult and expensive. Other challenges facing these 
investigations include questions over their legal basis, problems with interagency and 
intergovernment cooperation, and insufficient capacity of agencies tasked with pursuing these 
efforts.70  
 
Once illicit trade has been detected and investigated, prosecution presents further challenges. 
Winning a criminal case can involve overcoming high evidential standards and  proving criminal 
intent beyond reasonable doubt. There is also often a trade-off as to whether to prosecute offenders, 
or to allow illicit networks to continue to function. Allowing networks to carry on with their 
activities can allow enforcement agencies to gather more damning evidence, or to continue to 
collect intelligence about procurement architecture and the WMD program it is supplying.  
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Enforcement action can also have political dimensions. Considering the difficulties involved in 
pursuing export-control cases, some law-enforcement officials may prefer “to focus on traditional 
cases, things like drugs, bank robberies, illegal immigration,” where it is easier to make progress 
and “buoy the statistics that make everyone in a bureaucracy look good.”71 In one particularly 
thorny politicized case, the US released several prominent convicted Iranian procurement agents 
from prison as part of a prisoner swap, and dropped the charges against several other fugitives, as 
the JCPOA implementation day passed.72 As a result, US counterproliferation enforcement efforts 
have allegedly faced significant uncertainties since the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal.73  
 
As with cases of white-collar crime, prosecuting export-control violators is more complicated than 
prosecuting street criminals, and they often face similar challenges. 74 Crimes such as murder and 
robbery, for example, are more obviously illegal, while the nuances of export-control legislation—
such as complex technical specifications and international supply chains—further complicate 
prosecutions. As scholars have noted, “as a means of controlling white-collar and corporate crime, 
the criminal justice system is difficult to use and has not been exceedingly successful.”75 
 
Moreover, proliferation prosecution rarely results in sufficiently severe punishment; offenders 
“continue to receive low penalties even when violators are convicted.”76 The fate of the Khan 
network, for example, led one commentator to describe WMD proliferation as “the crime with no 
punishment.”77 While many members of the network served some time in prison or under house 
arrest, most members of the network evaded serious penalty due to the complexity of investigating 
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their activities, various shortfalls in national export-control legislation, and difficulties in obtaining 
mutual legal assistance from foreign governments and the extradition of key parties.  
 
The location of individuals and companies is also an important factor that can limit the prospects 
for deterrence. Entities based in territories with weak export controls and no appropriate 
extradition treaties with countries active in nonproliferation—in particular, the United States—are 
not threatened by the risk of punishment. The difficulty in gaining cooperation from foreign 
governments in prosecuting cases of illicit trade has led the US to impose nonproliferation 
sanctions against proliferators overseas.78 These sanctions are highly targeted, being focused on 
specific individuals and entities which intelligence suggests have been involved in proliferation-
related transactions.  
 
The implications of entities being designated – and thus the deterrent effect – varies according to 
the sanctions legislation used. However, being designated by the US government can have extra-
legal consequences, with large financial institutions and other businesses around the world 
frequently screening potential business partners against US lists. Ensuring that these measures 
punish those that they are being implemented against is challenging because entities frequently 
use aliases or establish front companies with different names to negate the effects of these 
designations.   
 
The deterrent effect also likely depends on the nature of the entity in question. US-targeted 
sanctions imposed on proliferators based in jurisdictions where export-control enforcement is 
problematic, are an example. The threat of penalty is more likely to have an effect on larger 
businesses with legitimate business interests and more to lose from fines or asset freezes than on 
middlemen well-versed in establishing new front companies.79  Similarly, businesses with well-
established brands have more to lose than anonymous middlemen and brokers. 
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While the prospects for deterrence are thus limited, evidence suggests that fear of penalties can 
work alongside other factors to drive compliance efforts by legitimate industry. Such fear can 
cause businesses to put in place an ICP or beyond-compliance practices to reduce the risk of 
inadvertent transfers that could trigger penalties. Such deterrence would likely have a widespread 
impact, given the clear majority of legitimate businesses are more likely to be law-abiding than 
knowingly seeking to supply WMD programs.    
 
The threat of further penalties on firms that have already been punished—perhaps a form of 
specific deterrence—has been shown to lead these companies to establish compliance programs.80 
Experience conducting outreach to industry in the United Kingdom suggests that specific 
deterrence through inspection may have utility. Those firms most at risk of being targeted by 
proliferation procurers for dual-use goods have often had some kind of contact with the authorities 
(although usually not resulting in noncompliance finding) and therefore often have more 
developed ICPs.81 General deterrence also has an important role to play, with the risk of 
“blacklisting” working as a significant compliance driver for firms.82 It should be noted, however, 
that the threat of penalties alone has limited explanatory value for why businesses go “beyond-
compliance.”83  
 
“Extra-legal” sanctions or consequences can also be important. These include reputational risks, 
with the perceived financial value of reputation viewed as particularly important.84 They also can 
include other factors such as “fear of peer disapproval, embarrassment or social stigma.”85 Beyond 
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fear, moral factors can also be important, especially in driving beyond-compliance behavior.86 The 
criminology literature notes that these can be as great a deterrent as the legal consequences.87 
 
In sum, it is clear that there are a good number of limitations on the explanatory power of the 
rational actor model. While entities are unlikely to become involved in illicit trade unless they 
believe the benefits outweigh the costs, such a model is simplistic. Proliferation is not always 
hugely profitable, and other social, moral and organizational factors also have explanatory value. 
The concept of deterrence through threat of punishment, a key tenant of efforts to prevent illicit 
trade, certainly has some value. However, the large number of barriers to ensuring that all those 
involved in illicit trade are punished means that there are challenges in putting this concept into 
practice.   
 
Framing proliferation opportunities 
 
Further insights for proliferation behavior can be gleaned by employing opportunity theory, a 
criminological approach that views “crime as a function of the characteristics of situations that 
offer the opportunity, to those inclined to take it, to benefit from an illegal act.”88 Like rational-
choice theory, it views humans as rational beings, but complements this insight with the notion 
that a specific opportunity for a criminal act must emerge.89 The opportunity, which adds a 
situation-specific dimension to the explanation of crime, arises from a combination of factors 
including a time, location, target, and lack of effective guardians.90 Opportunities can either present 
themselves or be actively created.91  
 
Opportunity-based models have been more frequently applied to street crime than to business 
crime, though Michael Benson of the University of Cincinnati and Sally Simpson of the University 
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of Maryland adapted the model to apply to white-collar crime, noting that the “opportunity arises 
out of some sort of legitimate business activity or process.”92 More specifically, white-collar 
criminal opportunities involve “an illegitimate process that is parasitical” on “a legitimate process 
that is typically followed in the world of business or government.”93 In proliferation cases, the 
process on which the “parasitic” illicit trade feeds is legitimate trade in sensitive WMD-related 
technologies, dual-use goods that are frequently legitimately traded for non-WMD uses.  
 
A criminal opportunity is based on a specific situation. The target could either refer to the 
proliferation-sensitive technology that the procurement agent is seeking to acquire or the company 
from which he is seeking to acquire it. The concept of “target attractiveness” could be applied to 
WMD proliferation.94 For example, the technology could be attractive because it is needed by a 
WMD program, or because it falls below the control thresholds and will not invoke heightened 
scrutiny by industry or government. A company could be an attractive target because it holds the 
required technology, is located in a state with weak export controls, or has substandard compliance 
efforts. The absence of effective guardians in a proliferation opportunity relates to the 
proliferator’s belief that the activity will not be discovered by the targeted supplier or by export 
controllers, customs officials, or intelligence services. The opportunity model—like rational-
choice based models—also assumes some level of calculus by those involved. 
 
The broad techniques used in WMD-related illicit trade are similar to those used by white-collar 
criminals: deception, abuse of trust, and concealment and conspiracy.95 The medium for a business 
inquiry in the present day usually takes the form of an email, asking whether a company can 
provide goods of a certain specification or to request a quote.96 The supplier’s response to this 
email will then shape the opportunity and the chances of the proliferator’s success.  
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Because proliferation opportunities often involve deception on behalf of the procurement agent, 
the concept of trust is important to these illicit transactions; that is, the target must trust the 
procurement agent sufficiently to complete the sale, either resulting from a pre-existing 
relationship or because the agent successfully misrepresents himself as a trustworthy purchaser.97 
Sutherland, who first defined white-collar crime, spoke of it as a “violation of delegated or implied 
trust.”98 Others have also placed trust as central to these types of opportunities and crimes, 
including in the context of nuclear smuggling. 99 
 
The lens of opportunity theory explains serial criminality by a series of opportunities that either 
present themselves or are sought by the malevolent actor. Repeat business is normal and desirable 
in the commercial world. In the same manner, a history of successful transactions is likely to lead 
to further opportunities in illicit trade, especially important in the acquisition of goods for WMD 
programs, where procurement agents are likely to have fewer options to procure goods of high 
technical specification because of their limited manufacturing base. 
 
Situational crime prevention: reducing proliferation opportunities  
 
Proponents of opportunity theories of crime have developed Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) 
measures to address specific types of criminal opportunities.100 SCP “intervenes in those causes 
which the offender encounters, or seeks out, in the immediate circumstances of the criminal 
event.”101 SCP measures are “directed at highly specific forms of crime.”102 In burglary, for 
example, an SCP relates specifically to a certain type of goods, e.g. theft of electronic goods or 
cars. SCPs also typically “involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate 
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environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible,” and seek to “make crime more 
difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable.”103 SCPs arguably provide a useful lens 
through which to consider nonproliferation measures; although a combination of deterrence and 
SCP measures are required to prevent illicit trade, enhancement of SCPs has and will continue to 
be beneficial for nonproliferation.  
 
Proliferation experts—who have the greatest understanding of the specific opportunities for 
proliferation—are better suited than criminologists to develop appropriate SCPs.104 This includes 
different nonproliferation actors at different levels responding to developments in proliferation and 
illicit trade. International organizations, governments, and industry can develop SCP measures to 
make illicit transactions more difficult. SCPs can modify the proliferation opportunity, increase 
the effort required to commit the offense, raise the risk of detection, reduce the rewards, and make 
it more difficult to justify or excuse.105  
  
The levels of awareness of illicit trade among industry actors are important in reducing 
proliferation opportunities. Efforts have been made to engage industry on these issues and raise 
the profile of illicit trade. Industry outreach has been conducted in many countries by international 
organizations, national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia. 
Some of these efforts focused on specific industrial sectors that are frequently targeted for their 
WMD-related goods, whereas other efforts have focused on broader exporter communities.  
 
Besides general awareness raising, more specific tools have been developed to supplement export-
control systems and allow exporters to better judge the legitimacy of potential transactions. These 
tools, in some sense, address the “trust paradox,” namely that being less trusting could reduce the 
overall possibility of being a victim of crime, but that it may also result in a decline in legitimate 
business.106 These measures provide a structured means for businesses to better judge the risks in 
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prospective transactions and see through a proliferator’s deceptive behavior. This includes making 
sure that exporters request full end-use and end-user information and conduct due-diligence 
screening of prospective customers. Governments and NGOs have also developed  lists of red flags 
to help exporters identify suspicious inquiries.107 
 
Exporters can play a proactive role in nonproliferation by informing governments of suspicious 
inquiries. This is becoming increasingly normalized in the US defense industry, with almost 
46,000 reports logged by US defense companies in 2015.108 These efforts feed into 
counterproliferation efforts and inform industry of ongoing and emerging risks. Through such 
actions and increased use of open-source intelligence techniques in due diligence, savvy exporters 
can become increasingly aware of the types of risks specific to their businesses. Key to the success 
of all these SCP measures is industry’s awareness—not merely of the relevant regulations and 
potential costs, but also of the need to go beyond compliance and the available tools to help entities 
avoid involvement in illicit trade.   
 
Conclusion: toward a norm against illicit trade  
With the increasing criminalization of illicit trade, the literature on criminology can yield 
important conceptual insights. Indeed it is surprising, given this increasing criminalization, that 
the literature on WMD proliferation has drawn so infrequently on the literature on crime and 
justice, in general, and white-collar crime and business crime, more specifically. This is still the 
case over a decade after UNSCR 1540 took steps to universalize the criminalization of illicit 
WMD-related trade. The framework outlined above seeks to inform nonproliferation efforts by 
providing a novel approach focused at the transactional-level, a thus far under-considered 
dimension.  
 
                                                 
107 US Bureau of Industry and Security, “Red Flag Indicators,” undated, 
<https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oee/compliance/23-compliance-a-training/51-red-flag-
indicators>.  
108 Anthony Capaccio, “Defense Contractors Credited for Finding a Russian Export Scheme,” Bloomberg, 
October 31, 2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-31/defense-contractors-credited-for-
finding-a-russian-export-scheme>. 
  
This initial survey provides several insights that could help enhance efforts to counter illicit trade, 
as well as points to avenues for further research, particularly as regards deterrence. Both 
quantitative studies, using open-source datasets of prosecutions, and qualitative analysis of case 
studies would greatly enhance our understanding. Since the criminology literature suggests that 
penalty certainty is more important than its severity, deterrence efficacy can be enhanced when 
states strengthen their ability to enforce controls. This work should be conducted alongside efforts 
ensuring that well-crafted export control laws are in place. Despite the limitations of deterrence  
and the rational-choice model, the threat of criminal sanction has been shown to have value, for 
example, in impelling firms to establish compliance programs. Efforts to increase the extra-legal 
costs of involvement could also work to enhance the deterrent effect.  
 
The limitations of the rational-choice model can be overcome by considering the specifics of 
individual cases. Opportunity theory provides a good starting point. Further research into 
proliferation opportunities could examine the specific social circumstances— beyond a focus on 
costs and benefits—that resulted in perpetrators turning to WMD-related illicit trade. The 
development and spread of nonproliferation SCP measures needs to continue. This includes 
generating more specific understandings of the proliferation risks in different industrial sectors, 
with particular emphasis on what beyond-compliance measures can help companies become 
proliferation resistant. Other new tools and training to help firms overcome the trust paradox can 
also be important, including helping industries learn how to benefit from new open-source tools 
and techniques for due diligence. While these measures are not a silver bullet against determined 
proliferators will can still operate in some jurisdictions with impunity, they will ensure that the 
private sectors in more advanced industrial countries do not contribute unwittingly to WMD 
programs.  
 
More broadly, the key to the success of both sets of nonproliferation tools—deterrence and SCP 
measures—is awareness of proliferation, export-control legislation, and potential costs. Within the 
toolbox of “nonproliferation norms,” efforts to further develop and publicize a norm against illicit 
  
trade could be productive.109 This would help raise awareness of the issue, reinforce extra-legal 
consequences, and help extract illicit trade from the realms of “invisible crime.”  
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